Is New Zealand’s coalition heading toward a one-term collapse? With National’s faltering leadership, ACT’s unpopular populism, and NZ First’s shifting base, Craig Young believes the 2026 election could bring major change.
Two years ago, I speculated on whether the current coalition government might be headed for a single term. Now, midway through its tenure, it’s worth revisiting that theory.
Let’s start with the National Party. Chris Luxon’s leadership and the party’s support have both declined in recent polls. Echoes of the Bolger-Shipley transition in 1998 are growing louder. Luxon’s subdued leadership and perceived reluctance to challenge coalition partners may lead to internal rumblings—possibly even a leadership spill or his resignation.
Luxon’s Pentecostal conservative Christian background has influenced his political stance. While he’s accepted that the abortion debate in Aotearoa is largely settled, thanks to the pro-choice victory in 2019, his social conservatism appears most visible in his engagement with anti-transgender rhetoric. His alignment with Winston Peters’ embrace of the transphobic moral panic seen in US and UK conservative circles has proven misguided.
Societal and political contexts vary across countries. While conservative parties in Britain, the US, Canada, and Australia have attempted to use anti-trans politics as campaign tools, the strategy has generally backfired. In Canada, Pierre Poilievre’s dog-whistle tactics on trans issues couldn’t prevent electoral loss, despite support in the West. In Australia, Peter Dutton’s anti-trans stance failed to address core voter concerns, particularly among women and suburban voters, on pressing issues like housing, health, and the cost of living. The result? A crushing loss for the Liberals across major states, with leadership succession battles now consuming the party.
In both countries, transphobia proved to be a fringe issue, unable to distract from material policy failures. These tactics fell flat, and similar approaches in New Zealand are unlikely to succeed, particularly for an incumbent government that’s already under pressure over health, housing, and employment woes.
Some commentators argue the “Trump Effect” might protect centre-right governments more than it does oppositions. That’s debatable. Even if Donald Trump’s return reshapes the US political landscape, protectionist tariffs and domestic chaos could still harm New Zealand’s economy and employment figures. If Luxon’s popularity continues to sink and National’s polling falls into the mid-20s, leadership change to Chris Bishop or Nicola Willis may be inevitable. Failing to act could leave the party vulnerable to intensified voter fatigue by 2026.
And what of the coalition partners?
ACT shoulders a significant share of the blame. Its populist anti-co-governance stance reignited support for New Zealand First and tied ACT to controversial positions. The Treaty Principles Bill, described as constitutional vandalism, was overwhelmingly rejected at the select committee stage. Yet David Seymour has vowed to revive it, doubling down on rhetoric, including a call to abolish the Human Rights Commission—an extreme stance for a party hoping to appear mainstream. This strategy risks alienating urban liberal voters and possibly losing Epsom or Tamaki.
As for New Zealand First, its leader, Winston Peters, has participated in four coalitions and seen the party fall out of Parliament twice. Historically supported by rural and elderly socially conservative voters, NZ First now reflects a mix of fringe views—anti-trans, anti-vaccination, anti-environment, and more—thanks in part to pressure group infiltration. These positions lack mainstream appeal.
Peters continues to invoke populist slogans and embrace authoritarian conservatives like Trump. Yet transphobic rhetoric has failed in recent elections abroad, revealing the emptiness of such dog whistles. His ongoing denial of these trends suggests a party out of touch. Should the coalition collapse, Peters might once again walk away, as he did in 1998, potentially triggering an early election and bringing down the government.
New Zealand First remains uniquely vulnerable. With no solid base, it could be eliminated from Parliament by a modest swing. Peters’ age (80) makes a future return increasingly unlikely. Shane Jones might see himself as successor, but his ability to carry the party forward is questionable.
So, how might change come?
Youth mobilisation was pivotal in Australia’s rejection of Dutton’s policies. A similar outcome is possible in New Zealand if Labour, the Greens, or Te Pāti Māori can inspire young voters. The Treaty Principles Bill has already galvanised Māori communities, a development that could strengthen Te Pāti Māori’s standing significantly.
If this coalition proves to be a one-term government, National should take note: uncritical acceptance of socially conservative populism is a liability, not an asset. As seen in Australia and Canada, it doesn’t win elections.
Whether this lesson applies equally to sitting governments as it does to oppositions is the final question. By next year, we may have our answer.
